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ABSTRACT
Private politics refers to situations in which activists or NGOs try to push
firms to conform to social standards (regarding, for instance, human
rights and environmental protection) without public policy intervention.
The existing literature on private politics has focused on large campaigns
such as consumer boycotts, and looked at the impact of those boycotts on
firms’ financial performance and on the likelihood that firms comply with
activist demands. Even though these large campaigns are important,
focusing on them leads to neglecting the fact that a large portion of the
time and resources that activists consecrate to private politics is used
to monitor firms and criticize them through Internet posting and media
statements, rather than to launch high profile campaigns. Little is known,
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however, about what drives these activists when they criticize companies,
why they target certain companies and not others, and whether this
criticism should be considered as a primary step in the production of
full-fledged campaigns. In this paper, we fill this gap by exploring a
unique international database of CSR-based criticisms against Fortune
500 companies for the 20062009 period. This database allows us to
look at the impact of a broad range of factors including industry differ-
ences, country/institutional differences and firm-specific dimensions, on
the likelihood that a certain firm will be targeted by activist critique.
Results indicate that criticism is driven by strategic intents. Similar to
previous literature, large and visible firms in certain industries are more
targeted than others. In addition, these firms also tend to come from
countries with strong institutions and high standards of living.
Keywords: Private politics; activists; Internet/media criticism
INTRODUCTION
Within the field studying firms’ nonmarket strategies (Baron, 2003), private
politics  in which activists launch campaigns and target firms in order to get
them to change their practices  has become more and more important (Beck,
2000; King & Pearce, 2010). Whereas public politics  in which activists and
other interest groups compete against firms in lobbying for public policy
changes (Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, & Bonardi, 2012)  is often perceived as
uncertain and difficult to manage, private politics has indeed proven to be an
effective way for activists to reach their goals and push firms to self-regulate
(Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Bunn, 20032004). These activists have evolved
into well-organized civil society groups that diligently scrutinize business
practices (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). To make uncovered social/environmental
issues salient, NGOs dispose of an arsenal of weapons to target or hit firms,
ranging from letter writing campaigns to media criticism (Bonardi & Keim,
2005), boycotts (Friedman, 1985) and public, sometimes violent, campaigns
(Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). NGOs, therefore, make use of “radio, televi-
sion and newspaper ads to condemn practices of particular firms, organize
boycotts, sit-ins, customer confrontations; and employ face-to-face challenges
in the form of blockades, protests, banner-hangs, and so on” (Sasser, Prakash,
Cashore, & Graeme, 2006, p. 06).
332 DOMINIK BREITINGER AND JEAN-PHILIPPE BONARDI
The academic literature has recognized this growing trend, and the number
of studies regarding private politics has risen significantly in recent years.
Theoretical pieces argue that activists, when they implement anticorporate
campaigns, pick their targets strategically based on the cost of consumers
switching to other products, as well as on how costly the campaign will be for
the target (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). In particular, companies with a strong
brand name or a high level of reputation are more likely to be targeted by
activists’ campaigns (King, 2008). Empirical studies on the phenomenon
confirm that target selection is heavily influenced by target characteristics:
companies that are large, visible, and financially successful seem to be pre-
ferred targets (King & Soule, 2007). Some studies also argue that an affiliation
to certain industries, particularly polluting industries, also matters (Lenox &
Eesley, 2009). Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves (2004) analyze 1,944 labor-
and environmental-related shareholder resolutions against 600 US firms in the
1990s. They provide evidence that companies with inferior social performance
significantly receive more shareholder resolutions. Likewise, companies that
“have produced products that have negative contingencies are preferred
stakeholder targets” Rehbein et al. (2004, p. 261). The study by Lenox and
Eesley (2009) examines the selection (targeting) and response strategies of 552
environmental campaigns organized against 273 US firms between 1988 and
2003. They find, similar to Rehbein et al., that smaller, less visible firms are
less likely to be targeted.
One limitation of this literature, however, is that it tends to concentrate
on large and very visible events such as boycotts (John & Klein, 2003;
King, 2008; Koku, Akhigbe, & Springer, 1997) or large campaigns (Eesley &
Lenox, 2006). In doing so, this literature neglects the fact that most of what
activists do is often more mundane and related to monitoring and
criticizing firms over the Internet or in the media, but without necessarily
launching these large campaigns. A significant part of activist behavior in
private politics has therefore not been studied empirically. Several questions
emerge as a result: Do activists pick corporate targets in the same way for
mundane criticism as they do for large campaigns? What drives activist
behavior for daily private politics, and what determines the intensity of the
pressure these activists put on firms?
Beyond studying why certain firms are targeted, this paper thus aims at a
better understanding of what drives activist behavior. Activists are presented
in the literature as playing two roles regarding firms and environmental or
social issues. First, activists can play a monitoring role: scan firms’ activities
around the world and act as whistleblowers when bad behaviors are spotted.
This role is seen as particularly important when multinational firms, using
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globalization to their advantage, operate in countries in which institutional
structures are too weak to prevent bad behaviors (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).
In this case, we should observe that activist targeting activities focus on
firms, mostly from developed countries, creating environmental and social
issues abroad. Second, activists can also use firms to gather attention to their
cause and build reputation or legitimacy (Den Hond & de Bakker, 2007).
This is what we call here the “strategic” motive for activism. In this case,
they will target well-known and visible firms, and even potentially CSR-
oriented firms, as a way to generate attention. One of the purposes of the
empirical section of this paper will be to provide insights regarding these
two mechanisms.
Note that this question leads to a deeper one that has to do with the
social production of corporate targets and shaming campaigns (Bartley &
Child, 2014). Even if criticizing is a different activity than running a
full-fledged campaign, both might be connected and criticism might in fact
be an early stage of private politics that might later lead to full campaigns.
So, are criticism and campaigns connected or are they two separate aspects
of private politics? The first potential view on this question is that criticism
is not strategic, and that the strategic decision-making (targeting) for the
activist comes later. Activists would monitor a large pool of environmental
and social issues, criticize and then strategically pick those that will become
targets in full anticorporate campaigns. In that case, criticism will be
mostly about random monitoring of companies, and will not display
the types of strategic behaviors highlighted by previous research on private
politics. The other view is that monitoring and criticizing firms are already
strategic behaviors. As such, there is no such thing as random criticism and
criticism is generally the first stage of an anticorporate campaigns.
Understanding this distinction is important for two reasons. First, managers
must understand how they need to react to criticism (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).
If criticism is strategic, then managers need to pay attention to it, even at an
early stage and even if the criticism is not very severe. Second, understanding
whether criticism is strategic is also important to account for the welfare
impact of activism. Activism, in effect, is often presented as an effective
counter-power to firms in a globalizing world, in which governments no
longer have the ability and authority to supervise questionable corporate
practices (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, if even criticism is strate-
gic, activism will probably be an imperfect way of supporting deficient
institutions in identifying environmental and social problems, in that this
identification will be skewed toward certain firms in certain places and
will leave many others without much surveillance.
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The second limitation of the current literature on private politics is that
it does not explore how country or institutional factors might have an
impact on the occurrence of public criticism or on its intensity. There are at
least two good reasons why these country factors might matter for criticism
and private politics in general. On the one hand, if public criticism is strategic,
then criticism will likely target firms in countries with higher standards of
living and stronger institutions. On the contrary, if criticism were not strategic,
but mostly about sheer monitoring to identify issues with corporate practices,
then we should expect it to target companies from and in countries with lower
standards of living and weaker institutional systems.
This discussion speaks to a broader debate about behavioral changes
regarding environmental or social issues. In particular, we should expect to
observe importance high impact of institutional factors on Internet/media
criticism if hypotheses such as the Environmental Kuznets curve bear some
truth. This theory, which has received some empirical support (Stern,
Common, & Barbier, 1996), suggests that people in countries with a certain
level of income per capita backed up by the right institutional environment
will give higher value to environmental quality and will take actions
accordingly. Higher standards of living and stronger institutions should
therefore have two effects: (1) push people to take action, become activists
themselves and monitor firms’ behaviors, and (2) create a fertile ground for
public criticism and campaigns against polluting or questionable corporate
behaviors. As a result, firms should receive more criticism the higher the
standards of living and the stronger the countries’ institutions. This would
bring support to the idea that human societies might self-regulate over time
and find ways to engage in development modes that are more sustainable.
In this paper, we explore these questions by building on a global dataset
of CSR-related criticism that includes Internet/media criticism for 451
multinational companies between 2006 and 2009. These companies are
incorporated in 26 countries and have been criticized for their operations in
114 countries. We also exploit these institutional variations and explore
whether country-level factors contribute to explain why certain firms
become private politics targets, and explanations for the intensity of the
criticism these companies face.
Our results suggest that criticism is indeed strategic. Activists use
mundane Internet/media criticism in a similar way to what has been
uncovered by previous literature for large campaigns and boycotts: large
and visible companies operating in close-to-consumer (food/beverage;
personal goods/textile) and controversial industries (e.g., tobacco; mining)
are more likely to be targeted. Moreover, new evidence is provided for
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the importance of country factors: companies that are incorporated in
countries of high educational level, environmental attitude, standard of
living, and low unemployment rates are preferred targets of NGO/media
activism, which is overall in line with the Environmental Kuznets Curve
approach and the idea that activists operate mostly in countries in which
there is a favorable audience for their claims.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. In the next section,
we explore the differences but also the potential connection between
criticism and activist campaigns, and build on these to develop testable
hypotheses in the following section. The section “Results” develops the
empirical tests. The last section discusses these results and concludes.
INTERNET/MEDIA CRITICISM AND
ACTIVIST CAMPAIGNS
Internet/Media Criticism and Campaigns as Different Aspects of
Private Politics
In this section, we highlight the differences between campaigns, which
has been the main focus of the existing literature, and the more mundane
criticism that constitutes the day-to-day activity of many activist organi-
zations. The first difference has to do with the content itself and where it
comes from. The theoretical literature on private politics models anticor-
porate campaigns as a demand by the activist  costly for the firm to
implement  associated with a threat of harm and a reward condition if
the activist’s demand is met (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). For example, in
the Rainforest Action Network case against Citigroup, which started
in 2000, the explicit demand by the activist was to get the bank to stop
financing activities that could endanger ecosystems. This demand was
originally made through a letter sent by the activist organization to
Citigroup and stating that: “Citigroup will have to extract itself from
unsustainable investments in fossil fuels to move its capital support to
renewable energy; they will have to cease funding destruction of primary
forest for timber or mining or oil exploration and transition that support to
alternative building supplies and paper materials” (Yurday & Baron,
2004). Internet/media criticism, on the other hand, is generally anonymous,
that is, it does not involve a well-identified activist group and articulates
neither a concrete demand nor a precise threat.
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In the same way, Internet/media criticism does not call for a precise
response from the firm, and its reputational implications are likely to be
quite different from campaigns both for the activist and for the firm. For
the firm, campaigns can have a highly negative impact on its reputation,
which even materializes in drops in share price (King & Soule, 2007). The
opposite is true for activists, who can derive important reputational bene-
fits from successful campaigns, especially in cases in which these activists
do not wish to get one firm to concede but rather a whole industry (Baron &
Diermeier, 2007). Internet/media criticism, on the other hand, typically
generates lower reputational impact and would probably have to be fol-
lowed by subsequent steps for concrete reputation loss to take place. Part
of the issue here also comes from the fact that criticism has a much lower
cost than full-fledged campaigns; a characteristic that could associate them
more with “cheap talk,” therefore generating a lower direct impact on
firms. Table 1 summarizes the key differences between public criticism and
activist campaigns.
The conclusion of this analysis is that Internet/media criticism and
corporate campaigns have different characteristics, and therefore should not
necessarily be expected to display the same characteristics as full activist
campaigns do. If corporate targets have been shown to be strategically
chosen in previous literature (King & McDonnell, 2015), criticism could be
of different nature. In particular, criticism could be considered to be mostly
about random monitoring, with activists thus playing a key role in scanning,
identifying, and revealing objectionable behaviors around the world.
Another view, however, could be that criticism and campaigns might be
different but related parts of private politics. From that angle, criticism would
already be strategic and would support the strategic targeting identified in the
previous literature for full-fledged campaigns. We explore this idea in the
next section.
Table 1. Public Criticism versus Activist Campaigns.
Criticism Campaigns
Generally anonymous Led by a well-identified activist group
No well-articulated demand Includes a specific demand
Lower cost to organize Higher cost to organize
Lower reputation impact both
for the firm and the activist
Higher reputation impact both
for the firm and the activist
Does not necessarily call for
a response by the firm
Calls for a response by the firm
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Internet/Media Criticism as Early Stage of Activist Campaigns
There are, in fact, two key theoretical reasons why Internet/media criticism
might already be strategic activities and therefore might be directly con-
nected to strategic targeting as in full campaigns. The first reason is that
activist organizations have limited attention capabilities (Ocasio, 1997) and
therefore need to selectively allocate these attention capabilities. This selec-
tion allocation could depend on many different factors associated with the
goals of the specific activist organization, but it is reasonable to assume
that this allocation follows a targeting approach that is akin to what
activists do when they target firms in full campaigns. The second reason to
believe that Internet/media criticism is strategic, more fundamental in nature,
is that environmental and social issues do not objectively exist but are rather
social constructions instrumented by activist organizations (Bartley & Child,
2014). From this perspective, the key question becomes about the role played
by Internet/media criticism in this social construction.
Conceptually, private politics can be considered to work as a chain
composed of different stages, with Internet/media criticism being one of the
early stages, in which the most attractive issues to pursue are selected, and
full-fledged campaigns being the last and triggering open confrontations
with firms.1 The sequence of the production chain of anticorporate
campaigns would thus start with the selection of a type of issue the activist
wants to focus on, followed by some media/Internet criticism against
targeted firms and potentially ending up with activists fighting a campaign
against this firm. This “private politics chain,” leading to the production of
full-fledged campaigns, is described in Fig. 1.
Assuming that activists behave strategically all along, the first step of
campaigns might be the selection of the countries in which to operate.
These countries will be the ones in which activists demand are the most
likely to be heard and supported by the local population. Similarly,
activists will probably select industries that will be the most likely to attract
attention. Based on these choices, activists will then pick the best target
firms to create attention to their cause, and then will monitor them closely
and will criticize them when the opportunity will appear. Among the firms
criticized, some will then be targeted with a specific demand and a threat of
harm, leading to a full campaign.
Note that considering criticism as an early stage of an activist campaign
also fits with the theoretical literature in a different way. In effect, the theo-
retical literature suggests that both firms and activists have in fact strong
incentives to agree on conditions that would avoid a costly campaign for
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both (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). In other words, in equilibrium full cam-
paigns should not occur and, in many cases, campaigns should stop early
in the production chain described in Fig. 1. On the other hand, criticism
should take place and often constitute the first step through which activists
create bargaining power in order to negotiate the settlement that will
prevent a full campaign. In fact, existing evidence suggests that whereas
relatively few full anticorporate campaigns take place, many others could
have the potential to be launched. For instance, Wright and Boudet (2012)
study different contexts in which campaigns could be expected to take
place. They show that only half of them actually do, in spite of problematic
environmental issues, organized interests monitoring them and early criticism
being voiced.
The implication of this analysis is that Internet/media criticism and full
campaigns could be directly connected, in which case they could be driven by
a set of similar factors. Another way of considering this is that public criticism
is a strategic activity, that is, it would not be about random monitoring but
would imply a primary selection of the right targets for activists. If this is the
case, then we should expect public criticism to be driven by a similar set of
factors to what has been identified in previous literature regarding full
campaigns. In what follows, we explore this theory and develop a set of
testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical analysis.
Monitoring, 
surveillance, 
scanning of 
potential issues
Criticism of
firms on the
Internet or in
the media
Official 
targeting and
demand with
a threat of 
harm
Full 
campaign
Strategic importance for the
activist organization
Reputational risk for the
firm
Selection by 
activists of 
countries to 
operate in and of
industries to 
target
Fig. 1. The Production Chain of Anticorporate Campaigns.
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HYPOTHESES
Based on our concept of private politics production chain, criticism should
be driven by country-specific factors, industry factors and firm-specific
ones. The last two are actually in line with the existing literature on private
politics and firm-activists relationships. Exploring country-specific or insti-
tutional factors, on the other hand, is one of the contributions of this
paper. We consider them in turn and derive hypotheses that will guide our
empirical analysis.
Firm-Specific Factors
In the context of the production of anticorporate campaigns, activists
might first focus their criticism on wealthy firms. Lenox and Eesley (2009)
argue that activists selectively target resource-poor firms (low cash flows),
as the “cost to an activist to deliver a certain level of harm to a firm, the
greater the firm’s financial capital” (2009, p. 50). Firms with higher cash
flows at their disposal might exert greater corporate opposition as they
“are able to support dedicated legal and public relation staff” (ibid.).
Nonetheless, opposite views claim that financially successful firms  that
is, wealthy in terms of assets and sales  trigger media attention because
they have the resources to meet activists’ demands (Yaziji, 2004). Therefore,
a wealthy firm can more easily implement the requested changes, under the
assumption that it does not employ its resources to “buffer,” the activism
raised against it. Whether resource-rich or -poor corporations attract
Internet/media attention will be left to the empirical analysis.
H1. The wealthier the firm, the higher the likelihood of becoming a
target of Internet/media criticism.
Further, it has been argued in the targeting literature that firm “size alone
may be a reason why activists target companies” (Graves, Rehbein, &
Waddock, 2001; Rehbein et al., 2004, p. 250). This is based on the general
observation that firm size is usually highly correlated with firm visibility,
which in turn creates higher media attention for the stakeholder’s campaign
(Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Additionally, targeting scholars claim that
“[L]arge, visible firms are attractive targets as campaigns against them are
more likely to garner attention from the media and the general public”
(Lenox & Eesley, 2009, p. 50). If criticism is strategic, we should therefore
expect visible firms to be targeted.
In a similar vein, Baron & Diermeier posited that companies with “pri-
mary and prominent brand(s)” (2007, p. 612) are more likely to be selected
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as activists expect to derive publicity for themselves. Therefore, well-known
firms might be preferred targets as contentions with these firms are more
“visible” and make the activists themselves better known. The “better
known a company is, the juicier the target it makes” (Yaziji, 2004, p. 111;
see also Diermeier & van Mieghem, 2005; Hendry, 2006). Moreover, contri-
butions to social movement theory associate such “potential threats of
negative publicity” (Den Hond & de Bakker, 2007, p. 911) with highly
exposed, well-known companies and/or brands. Following this reasoning,
we derive the following hypothesis:
H2. The more visible the firm, the higher the likelihood of becoming a
target of media/Internet criticism.
Finally, the CSR (i.e., social or environmental) performance of a company
has also been discussed as a potential factor that attracts or buffers activist
attention. In particular, socially responsible firms might receive more activist
attention particularly because of their “emphasis on social responsibility”
(Argenti, 2004, p. 111). Since firms are “thought to be sympathetic” (Baron &
Diermeier, 2007, p. 612), that is more receptive to social and environmental
concerns, such “truly socially responsible companies” (Argenti, 2004, p. 111)
are more likely to become targeted (King & McDonnell, 2015). In this
vein, it has been further argued that good “corporate students” are
evaluated more strictly in such a way that they keep up their good perfor-
mance. Luo, Meier, and Oberholzer-Gee (2010) suggest that the media are
more likely to report on corporate “environmental sins” if target firms indicate
better environmental records, and provide higher degrees of CSR transpar-
ency (disclosure of environmental performance data). If criticism is strategic,
firms that have presented themselves as CSR-oriented firms could therefore be
attractive targets for activists.
H3. Companies that are perceived as more socially/environmentally
responsible are less likely to be targeted by Internet/media criticism.
Industry Factors
In the context of the production chain of anticorporate campaigns presented
in Fig. 1, activists should be expected to pick firms in industries that might be
well known from the public and that can be easily associated to questionable
behaviors. Yaziji (2004), for instance, posits that companies are particularly
exposed to external criticism if they sell unhealthy products (tobacco, alco-
holic beverages), offer dangerous services (gambling, pornography), or even
produce dangerous goods (weapons, nuclear energy). Studies on corporate
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reputation emphasize the inherent dangers to which a high-reputation firm is
exposed if it operates in a per se relatively controversially perceived industry
(see Barnett & Hoffmann, 2008).
As indicated previously, Rehbein et al. (2004) provide evidence for such
industry-affiliation claims. They find that operating in industries that are
likely to “produce negative contingencies” (p. 249) provokes NGO/media
attention. King and Soule (2007), as well as King (2008), provide further
empirical evidence that supports this believed causality between industrial
controversy and stakeholder activism. Similar to full campaigns, activists
might thus pick targets in industries that will easily generate interest and
support from the public.
H4. Companies that operate in controversially perceived industries are
more likely to be targeted by Internet/media criticism.
Similarly, high consumer exposure (Weber & Marley, 2012), that is operating
close to final customers, may increase the targeting likelihood (Bartley &
Child, 2014). Baron and Diermeier (2007) reason that it “may be relatively
low cost for an activist” (p. 614) to damage the reputation of a “consumer
product company (…) whereas harming an industrial products company
may be quite costly” (ibid.). This argument is not only explained by higher
customer visibility. In fact, it has also been associated with the existence of
substitute products. For example, the boycott against Shell’s Brent Spar
oilrig in 1995 was highly successful for Greenpeace because final consu-
mers, who followed the NGO’s boycott call, incurred comparatively low
switching costs by “easily” getting fuel elsewhere (see Diermeier & van
Mieghem, 2005). Resource-dependence theory explains such stakeholder
movements according to which consumers can successfully withhold
resources from a firm if they possess power (e.g., knowledge) over this
company (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This is the case for corporations whose
products are close to the final consumer. Thus, if criticism is strategic, we
hypothesize that:
H5. Companies that operate in “close-to-consumer” industries are more
likely to be targeted by Internet/media criticism.
Country-Specific and Institutional Factors
Country-specific and institutional factors have not been considered yet in
the private politics literature. Yet, they should have an impact and could
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help identify whether criticism are driven by strategic intent or by sheer
monitoring. Within the production chain of anticorporate campaigns, acti-
vists are likely to issue criticism against firms from countries in which the
population will be sympathetic to the cause that these activists want to
defend. Previous literature suggests, in fact, that the level of intensity and
severity of activists or NGOs criticism vary across countries (Wapner,
2009). A firm like Nestle´ from Switzerland, for instance, has been much
more criticized for using palm oil than one of its large rival, Unilever, from
the United Kingdom. Doh and Guay claim that activists search for particu-
lar “access points” (2006, p. 52) per country due to national particularities.
Additionally, Diermeier and van Mieghem (2005), with regard to the Brent
Spar case, illustrated how Greenpeace chose not to target Shell Plc.
in England, but instead concentrated its activism on Shell’s German
subsidiary because Germany was deemed more receptive and sensible to
environmental concerns.
Socioeconomic conditions have also been shown to matter to influence
citizens’ attitudes toward firms, toward corporate social responsibility
activities, and toward the potential need for self-regulation (Matten &
Moon, 2008). In that spirit, socioeconomic conditions that structurally
shape behaviors, for instance, through a country’s level of education or
its employment rate (Beck & Levine, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 2000) should matter in the context of activists’
targeting decisions. Firms incorporated in a country with a high level of
education could be more strictly scrutinized than companies incorporated
in countries where citizens are less knowledgeable and aware of social and
environmental issues.
The literature on sustainable development and growth also supports the
idea that individuals in a society should display a higher willingness to pay
for better environmental conditions and cleaner air the higher the standard
of living in the country. In particular, the Environmental Kuznets curve
theory argues that environmental degradation first increase with income
and then reaches a threshold after which environmental degradation
decreases with income (Stern et al., 1996). The factors driving this inverted-U
relationship between per capita income and pollution are generally con-
sidered to be related to the evolution from industry-oriented economies to
more information-intensive and service-oriented ones, as well as to a
higher environmental awareness, stronger environmental regulations and
more advanced green technologies. However, in addition to these factors,
a stronger scrutiny on business practices and more pressure on polluting
firms should also take place, once the income threshold has been reached,
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in order for the downward part of the curve to emerge. From this perspec-
tive, companies incorporated in countries with higher standard of living
should also be criticized more often and more intensely than companies
incorporated in countries that have not reached that threshold.
Similarly, other measures of a country’s wealth such as the unemploy-
ment level of unemployment or a country’s level of education should be
associated with a higher level of activism and therefore more criticism
against firms.
H6. The better the socioeconomic situation of a country, the higher the
likelihood for firms incorporated in that country to be targeted by
Internet/media criticism.
Second, institutional characteristics might matter as well. More democratic
and less corrupt institutions create plenty of opportunities for outside parties
to voice their concerns not only about what government officials are doing
but also about what firms and managers do (Dyck & Zingales, 2002).
Institutions include “constitutions, laws, policies, [hence] any formal agree-
ments” (Doh & Guay, 2006, p. 52) that are (formally) set up in the national
context to “provide the background conditions against which the actions of
individuals and associations take place” (ibid.; see also Jones, 1999). The
stakeholder literature has emphasized, albeit without much real empirical
analysis, the variation across national political environments. Doh and Guay
(2006) and De Bakker and den Hond (2008), for instance, highlight such
governmental variance, notably between Europe and the United States, by
referring to: “the opposition of several European countries to the marketing
of genetically modified crops and food in Europe; the insistence of US-firms
and Government to enforce patent protection for Aids/HIV medication
in developing countries; as well as the differing national commitments to
CO2-emission reductions of the Kyoto Protocol” (ibid.).
Institutions favoring a strong governance and control over government
officials, for instance, through less corruption and more democracy, should
also offer more opportunities for activists to voice their concerns and criti-
cize business practices. As governments seem to influence companies in their
behaviors and decisions, they might also influence activists in their targeting
strategies. Therefore, favorable country contexts might actively encourage
stakeholder activism and strategic criticism for firms for certain countries
(see, e.g., Jones, 1999).
H7. The less corrupt and more democratic the institutions of a country,
the higher the likelihood for firms incorporated in that country to
become targeted by Internet/media criticism.
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DATA AND METHODS
To explore our hypotheses empirically, we built a unique dataset of firms
that were exposed to CSR-related criticism from 2006 to 2009. The firm
sample consists of the world’s most admired firms, annually ascertained by
Fortune. To become eligible, corporations must surpass $10 billion in
revenue and rank among the largest firms within their industry peers
(by revenue). We chose this sample as the firms included are typically large
multinationals, which exposes them to various different sociocultural
contexts and stakeholder scrutiny. Data for these firms are also relatively
easy to access. The Fortune survey for the period 20062009 contains
642 companies, which have been part of the ranking at least once, and we
obtained detailed data for 451 of them. We matched this sample with
another database covering Internet/media criticism. The database on
CSR-related criticism was, in its original form, provided by the Swiss-based
consultancy Reprisk, whose mission is to capture the impact of external
factors on a firm’s reputation. It includes criticism information collected
for many firms part of the ranking since 2006. Each firm-specific criticism
contains detailed information about the content, initiator, date, and location
of the reported stakeholder action, as well as its level of severity.
We tried to make sure that our database contained only criticism, and
not other stages of the campaigns production chain in two ways. First,
we considered only the first criticism and avoided any further one, or any
escalation of the same criticism: once a criticism has been made, it is not
considered a second time in our data. Second, we looked at all the criticism
one by one and excluded the ones that were referring to larger actions such
as boycotts or organized actions.
The constructed panel dataset merges the data on firms and criticism
exposure for the 20062009 period, and comprises 8,054 Internet and
media criticism observations for the Fortune-rated companies. Criticism is
considered from a large number of different sources (both Internet and
media sources) expressed in nine languages.2 The collapsed dataset gener-
ates 1,419 firm-level observations once missing data are taken into
account. This results in 4.7 criticisms per firm and year on average (see
Table 2), but with significant variations across firms; some firms being
criticized often and others hardly or never. Further, the severity of each
criticism, as evaluated by Reprisk, varies between three degrees (13, see
Fig. 2), with a value of 1 indicating light criticism (e.g., the firm being
criticized for being slow at issuing an environmental report), whereas
3 indicates very severe criticism for the company reputation (e.g., the firm
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being accused of jeopardizing customers’ health). These different levels of
severity are coded for each criticism reported by two independent analysts
of the consultancy, based on several predefined criteria that determine the
extent and severity of the accusation. Tables 2 and 3, as well as Figs. 2 and
3, provide a description of the criticism included in our database: per indus-
try, per country, number of criticism and severity.
Dependent Variable(s)
Because our empirical approach is exploratory, we consider different esti-
mation methods using both the firm sample and the criticism samples.
First, we look at the probability of a firm being criticized in our sample,
and consider probit models in which the dependent variable takes a value
of 1 if a firm has been criticized in a given year. Second, we take a first
look at the intensity of the criticism and consider whether there are dif-
ferences in the factors that lead firms to be targeted by severe criticism,
Table 2. Number of Criticisms Collected 20062009.
Variable/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of criticisms p.a. (TCQ) 604a 1,657 3,269 2,524
Number of firms included in the criticism database 451 451 451 451
Average number of criticisms per firm 1.34 3.67 7.25 5.60
aThe database for CSR criticism was only established in 2006; this explains the fewer number
of firm-criticism observations for 2006, provided in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3. Number of Criticism per Country of Origin of the Firms.
Country Total Country Total
USA 3,741 Australia 128
UK 1,043 Others 121
Germany 777 Brazil 86
France 541 Luxembourg 84
Netherland 486 Russia 84
Switzerland 419 Canada 70
Japan 318 Finland 66
China 185 Italy 66
Korea 154 Belgium 52
Spain 136 Indonesia 41
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instead of the overall criticism. We therefore compute a binary outcome
variable (“severe criticism”) that indicates whether a company has been
exposed to severe stakeholder activism (categories 2 and 3 in our data)
over a year. Again, we just use simple probit models. Third, we move
from the firm level to the criticism level and create an ordinal-dependent
variable that includes all four possible different levels of harm/critique a
corporation can be exposed to: from zero (i.e., zero harm or no criticism)
to 3, with 3 being the most severe level of criticism activity. We then use
ordered probit to explore the drivers for the intensity of criticism. For all
these models, we include year dummies and compute robust standard
errors by clustering at the firm level.
Independent Variables
Firm-Level Variables
To test the hypotheses H1H4 assessing the influence of corporate factors
on critique exposure, we first estimate the influence of financial dimensions:
firm assets, considered in logarithm to account for skewness, and cash flow,
as proxies of resource-richness. To account for firm profitability, we further
include Return on assets (ROA). Sales  also in logarithm  are inserted
Fig. 2. Number and Severity Levels of Corporate Criticisms.
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as a measure of firm size. All financial data were obtained from Thomson-
Datastream and, for the sake of comparability, considered in logs. To
approximate firm visibility in terms of brand awareness, we compute
another binary variable that indicates whether a firm possesses top brands
(annually ranked by Interbrand)3 in its corporate portfolio. The absolute
brand values were not included because of insufficient data.
With regard to variables regarding a firm’s CSR performance (as
hypothesized in H4), we include a binary variable that distinguishes
companies that belong to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI).4 As
an approximated measure of ecological/environmental performance, we
construct a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm disclosed its
Fig. 3. Number of Criticisms per Industry.
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carbon footprint (proxied by the data from the carbon disclosure project,
CDP).5 Absolute scores were not taken into consideration as they would
have restrained the estimation sample significantly. We finally compute a
binary variable that controls whether a company is publicly listed.
Industry-Level Variables
To identify industry-specific effects, as hypothesized in H5, we compute
dummy variables for each industry sector based on the sector-classification
of the criticism database.
Country-Level Variables
To evaluate whether an NGO/media’s firm selection depends on the
particularities of the country in which the firm is established, we inserted
variables that mirror the (institutional) quality of a country as well as its
socioeconomic situation following measures used in previous studies (see,
e.g., Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2011; Sachs, 2003).
First, to estimate the influence of socioeconomic factors as hypothesized
in H6, we include the GDP (Gross Domestic Product)  annual growth
rate per capita  and the country’s annual unemployment rate as economic
measures. To account for sociological factors, we insert a country’s
education index, as well as an indicator of its standard of living. The data
for all three variables was obtained from the United Nations’ Development
Program (UNDP) database.6 Further, to take into account the growing
importance of environmental awareness in many nation-states (Halme &
Huse, 1997; Philippe & Durand, 2011), we also include a measure indicating
a country’s environmental consciousness, proxied by the environmental
performance index (EPI).7
Second, to capture the effects of institutional factors as hypothesized in
H7, we include governance indices that constitute approved proxies for
indicating a country’s institutional quality (see, e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2011;
Sachs, 2003). Such governance data was obtained from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) project.8 Therefore, we consider four
variables: Voice and accountability indicates to what extent “a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as free-
dom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009, p. 6). Political stability “measures the perceptions
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism”
(ibid.). Finally, control of corruption mirrors “perceptions of the extent to
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which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and
private interests” (ibid.).
RESULTS
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Results of
our empirical investigation are provided in Table 5. We first discuss the
results of the targeting likelihood estimations (Models 12), and then
move to explore the determinants of criticism intensity (Model 3).
Results for Model 1  General Criticism Sample
In the first column of Table 5, we estimate the likelihood that firms will
become a target of Internet/media criticism. Among the corporate factors,
the two variables signaling firm size and visibility  sales and brand
awareness  have a significant impact on the targeting likelihood, providing
support to H2. Likewise, for stock-listed corporations, belonging to the
DJSI increases the targeting likelihood (supporting H3). This implies that
corporations with a stronger CSR orientation are more likely to be targeted,
a result that is in line with what was found by Luo et al. (2010) regarding
media coverage of oil spills. These first results are strongly in line with
the idea that Internet/media criticism is already a strategic stage, that is,
that activists pick the corporate targets that are the most likely to attract
attention to their cause.
With regard to industry effects, service industries such as travel/leisure,
insurance/banking, telecom, and media particularly reduce the targeting
likelihood. This is in line with the argument that service industries are
perceived as less polluting industries than those of the manufacturing sectors
(see, e.g., Cole, 2000). Interestingly, low statistical support could be provided
for H4 and H5: among the controversial industries, only Mining is more
likely to be targeted, and traditional B2C sectors, for example, Food and bev-
erage or Automotive, do not seem to affect the targeting likelihood either.
Regarding country effects, our results suggest, on the one hand, that the
targeting likelihood is high for firms incorporated in countries for which insti-
tutions are less stable and democratic. The coefficients of voice/accountability
and political stability as proxies of political/institutional influence (H7)
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation.
Mean S.D. Criticism Criticism
Intensity
Cash
flow
ROA Sales Assets DJSI Envt.
Disclos.
Notlisted Top
Brand
GDP
Growth
Unemployment Life
Quality
Educ. Envt.
Consc.
Voice
Account
Pol.
Stab.
Anticorrupt
Criticism 0.72 0.23
Criticism
Intensity
1.36 0.37 1.00
Cash flow 8.52 3.08 0.07 0.12 1.00
ROA 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.23 1.00
Ln Sales 17.8 12.05 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.10 1.00
Ln Assets 10.2 5.3 0.24 0.26 0.00 0.12 0.67 1.00
DJSI 0.51 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.12 1.00
Envt. Disclo. 0.69 0.53 0.25 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.45 0.42 0.15 1.00
Notlisted 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.31 1.00
Top Brand 70.3 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.10 1.00
GDP Growth 1.45 0.89 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.07 1.00
Unemployment 4.61 0.95 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.07 1.00
Life Quality 77.4 0.48 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.43 0.25 1.00
Education 77.2 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.31 0.43 0.50 1.00
Envt. Consc. 81.9 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.05 0.57 0.33 0.18 0.02 1.00
Voice Account 85.7 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.11 0.73 0.25 0.55 0.24 0.51 1.00
Pol. Stab. 66.4 0.75 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.36 0.22 0.32 0.21 0.43 0.53 1.00
Anticorrupt 87.4 0.34 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.18 0.09 0.66 0.08 0.57 0.28 0.52 0.59 0.52 1.00
First column (Criticism): Firm sample, n=1,419; Other columns: Full issue sample, n=8,054.
Table 5. Likelihood of a Firm Being Targeted.
Variables Probit Model (1) Probit Model (2) Model (3)
General criticism Severe criticism Criticism intensity
Probit Probit Ordered probit
Corporate influence
Ln cash flow 0.025 0.045 0.0380
(0.0698) (0.082) (0.054)
ROA (return on assets) 0.310 0.137 0.710
(0.878) (0.930) (0.841)
Ln sales 0.471*** 0.359* 0.401***
(0.099) (0.101) (0.075)
Ln assets 0.066 0.211* 0.054
(0.096) (0.114) (0.072)
Social performance (DJSI) 0.180* 0.152 0.099
(0.112) (0.189) (0.175)
Environmental disclosure 0.0170 0.120 0.130
(0.120) (0.119) (0.085)
Nonpublic listed dummy 1.007 1.196 1.047
(1.224) (1.404) (1.359)
Top brand dummy 0.655*** 0.240** 0.337***
(0.128) (0.099) (0.083)
Country/institutional factors
GDP growth rate per capita 0.0221 0.020 0.067*
(0.051) (0.077) (0.029)
Unemployment 0.160 0.279*** 0.011
(0.193) (0.451) (0.009)
Life quality 0.055** 0.029 0.022***
(0.0242) (0.026) (0.0072)
Level of education 0.010 0.284*** 0.058*
(0.041) (0.072) (0.003)
Environmental consciousness 0.143*** 0.061** 0.042***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.013)
Voice and accountability 0.081** 0.191*** 0.0028
(0.0375) (0.068) (0.0082)
Political stability 0.0355* 0.008 0.022***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.0036)
Control of corruption 0.101*** 0.081** 0.0171*
(0.032) (0.044) (0.008)
Industry influence
Aerospace/defense 0.490 0.312 1.092**
(0.577) (0.355) (0.527)
Automotive 0.302 1.508* 0.720*
(0.371) (0.692) (0.376)
Chemicals 0.555 0.011 1.052**
(0.689) (0.422) (0.529)
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Table 5. (Continued )
Variables Probit Model (1) Probit Model (2) Model (3)
General criticism Severe criticism Criticism intensity
Probit Probit Ordered probit
Construction 0.90 1.112** 1.398***
(0.575) (0.488) (0.527)
Financial industry 1.098* 1.428** 1.366**
(0.610) (0.644) (0.571)
Food/beverage 0.0833 1.677** 1.181**
(0.362) (0.712) (0.343)
Insurance 1.429** 1.326*** 1.978***
(0.609) (0.279) (0.579)
Mining 1.126** 1.241** 1.211*
(0.402) (0.474) (0.544)
Oil/gas 0.528 0.367 0.942*
(0.599) (0.389) (0.521)
Personal-/household goods 0.232 1.478** 0.419
(0.356) (0.752) (0.557)
Pharmaceuticals 0.390 0.590 0.397
(0.355) (0.665) (0.429)
Retail 1.002*** 1.101** 0.893**
(0.359) (0.347) (0.406)
Tobacco 0.345 1.901** 1.131*
(0.658) (0.788) (0.272)
Utilities 0.399 0.417 1.058**
(0.555) (0.525) (0.518)
Computer/electronics 0.371 1.053 0.619
(0.367) (0.678) (0.489)
Telecom/media 1.402*** 1.634*** 1.632***
(0.360) (0.377) (0.370)
Travel/leisure 0.800** 1.112 1.033***
(0.361) (0.373) (0.411)
Raw materials 0.555 1. 283** 1.027**
(0.572) (0.552) (0.510)
General industrials 1.165** 1.751*** 1.541***
(0.558) (0.563) (0.566)
Constant 12.82*** 9.48*** Cut1 6.287***
(4.122) (4.553) Cut2 7.016***
Cut3 9.863***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald Chi2 306.62*** 238.94*** 206.71***
Pseudo R2 21% 25% 19%
Observations 1,419 1,419 8,054
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
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are both negative and significant. These results are further supported by the
socioeconomic influence factors hypothesized in H6: firms incorporated in
countries of low-living standards are preferred targets. Together, these results
do not support the idea of strategic criticism and would rather suggest that a
part of activists’ behaviors is about monitoring of corporate issues for firms
from countries in which issues are likely to occur.
On the other hand, evidence is also provided for superior country variables.
Companies that are incorporated in countries of high environmental
consciousness (H6) attract unwanted NGO/media attention. This finding
is endorsed by the corruption indicator, a further measure of institutional
quality (H7): the better a firm’s home-country controls corruption, the
higher the company’s targeting likelihood becomes. These results on envir-
onmental consciousness and control of corruption are in line with what
we would expect if activists select firms from countries that are positioned
“high up” in the Environmental Kuznets Curve.
Overall, these results are thus somewhat two-sided and seem to suggest
that activists adopt complementary targeting behaviors. They talk to a cer-
tain audience by targeting large firms in countries in which CSR is perceived
important. However, activists also play a monitoring role and uncover
dubious behaviors for firms from countries in which institutions are weak.
With regard to the actual strength of the effects, the estimated coeffi-
cients in probit, nonlinear regression models cannot be interpreted directly
and we thus calculated marginal effects. These marginal effects for firm
sales and firm (brand) awareness are 14% and 17%, respectively. Further,
the marginal effect of social performance accounts for a 5% increase in the
probability of becoming a target. Companies incorporated in countries of
high environmental attitude (consciousness) increase the targeting likeli-
hood by 5%. Companies incorporated in low-living quality countries
increase their targeting likelihood by 2%. The institutional parameters
voice/accountability and political stability increase the targeting likelihood
by 2% and 1%, while with growing control of corruption the targeting like-
lihood increases by 3%. The largest marginal effects were calculated for
the service industries that range between 28% and 52%.
Model 2: Likelihood of Being Severely Criticized
Regarding the likelihood of being severely targeted by Internet/media
activism (Model 2 in Table 5), results regarding corporate factors are overall
in line with what was observed for the General criticism sample, except
that the coefficient regarding “Assets” is now significant, but only at the
10% level.
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Additionally, in contrast to what was observed for the General criticism
model, industry effects appear more impactful as drivers of severe criticism. In
line with H5, individual industry-fixed effects indicate that close-to-consumer
operating industries attract unwanted Internet/media attention. Firms
producing food/beverages, as well as Personal/household goods, which
include the textile/fashion sector, or Automotive, are more likely to be
targeted. Moreover, operating in controversially discussed industries
such as mining and tobacco positively influences the likelihood of severe
criticism, and therefore lends some support to H4.
On the country level, five variables seem to encourage criticism activity
relative to firms: companies are especially targeted if they are incorporated in
countries of high environmental attitudes, efficient corruption control, high
educational levels and low unemployment rates. Again, these results seem
very much in line with the idea that activists pick targets from countries that
tend to be high in the Environmental Kuznets Curve, that is, countries in
which citizens are likely to be sympathetic to the activists’ cause.
With regard to the magnitude of the coefficients, the largest marginal
effects were again estimated for the significant industry variables that range
between 31% and 45%. On the country level, low unemployment rates and
high education levels increase the targeting likelihood by 10%, supporting
the idea that activists target firms to fit with a certain audience of educated
and relatively wealthy readers. The remaining significant socioeconomic
and institutional parameters show marginal effects between 2% and 6%.
Model 3: Determinants of Criticism Intensity
Moving now to criticism as dependent variable, the results of the ordered
probit specifications of Model 3 are presented in the third column of
Table 5. The three cut-off levels are significant, suggesting that the proposed
criticism thresholds constitute different severity levels of critical allegations.
A positive sign of the coefficients implies a higher likelihood that the raised
critique is harsh or very harsh. Regarding firm-specific factors, positive and
significant coefficients can be observed for firm sales, and brand awareness,
in line with H2. Results are also consistent with our previous estimates
regarding industry effects: as for the likelihood of being severely targeted,
criticism are more likely to be harsh for controversial sectors, like Mining or
Tobacco, and for close-to-consumers sectors such as Food & Beverage or
Automotive. This is again consistent with H4. Together, these results support
the idea of a relatively close connection between mundane and more severe
criticism, and our concept of production chain for anticorporate campaigns.
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On the country level, factors such as companies being incorporated in
countries with high environmental attitudes, education and anticorruption
levels, and GDP growth rates raise the likelihood of more intense activism.
At the same time, the negative signs of the two significant coefficients living
quality and political stability indicate that inferior life quality also implies
that Internet/media criticism will likely be severe. Again, our results regarding
country-specific and international factors are thus not one-sided. Activists
seem to engage both in strategic behaviors by making harsher criticism
against firms from countries in which socioeconomic and institutional condi-
tions will create a fertile ground for activists’ claim, but activists also monitor
and make harder criticism against companies from countries that are less
stable institutionally and poorer. Both strategic and monitoring behaviors
therefore seem to be at play.
DISCUSSION  CONCLUSION
This paper makes three contributions to the private politics literature.
First, our results suggest that media/Internet criticism against firms seems
to be driven by factors similar to what has been previously observed for
full-fledged activist campaigns. As such, this study provides support to the
idea that public criticism can be seen as the first step of a chain leading to
the production of these campaigns. Depending on the model, firm sales,
assets, and brand awareness positively influence the targeting likelihood.
This is in line with studies showing that activists pick targets not only to
highlight issues but also to attract attention and create legitimacy, which is
more likely with large and visible firms (King & Soule, 2007; Lenox &
Eesley, 2009). Internet/media criticism should therefore be seen as one of
the first steps in private politics, potentially leading subsequently to larger
campaigns, rather than standalone activities with their own logic.
Similarly, some of our results indicate that a firm’s CSR orientation, as
measured through its inclusion in DJSI, makes it more likely to be targeted.
This is also in line with social movement/stakeholder theory in that transpar-
ently operating firms disclosing CSR-data offer more room for criticism (see,
e.g., Luo et al., 2010). These findings also support the strategic accounting
literature, which associates the provision of corporate information with
a competitive disadvantage for the disclosing firm (see, e.g., Verrecchia,
2001). Alternatively, these firms might be particularly targeted by activists
who suspect firms of “green-washing” Laufer (2003).
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Additionally, we also found that industry effects matter, especially in
explaining more severe criticism. Companies operating in industries that
are controversial (mining, tobacco) or close to final customers (e.g., food/
beverage, textile sector) seem to be preferred targets for activists when
engaging in severe media criticism. These results indicate that, in these
industries, activists might better emphasize the urgency and legitimacy of
their claims and protests as suggested by stakeholder theory (Mitchell,
Agle, & Wood, 1997). Moreover, these findings endorse explanations
stating that activists select these industries where they expect higher returns
in terms of corporate compliance/responses to the activists’ requests
ex post (Baron & Diermeier, 2007; King & McDonnell, 2015). These results
regarding industry effects are also in line with the boycott literature:
consumers are willing to support a boycott as long as affordable substitute
products are available (Diermeier & van Mieghem, 2005). This is certainly
the case in the food/beverage sector, and with personal/household goods
and clothes.
One important implication of these results is that managers should not
take criticism lightly. If criticism is already a strategic stage that might lead
to the production of full campaign against their firm, managers need to
anticipate and think about possible reactions even at this early criticism
stage. This idea speaks to two streams of literature on private politics.
First, it is in line with existing empirical results that show that negative
public exposure, both in the media and in the Internet, has a significant
and positive impact on the development of CSR activities among firms that
are exposed (Zyglidopoulos, Carroll, Georgiadis, & Siegel, 2012). Second,
our analysis is also in line with the theoretical literature on private
politics, which tend to suggest that full campaigns are often preempted
and do not occur because both the activists and the firm have incentives
to negotiate at early stages and avoid the costs for both of running the
full campaign (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). Criticism might thus be an
important early point of contact between firms and activist, leading to the
development of more sustainable practices even before any major conflict
has emerged.
The second contribution of this paper to the literature has to do with
how country-specific and institutional differences influence private politics,
which have not been explored in previous literature. We find that both the
occurrence and the intensity of criticism against firms are, at least partially,
driven by these country-specific and institutional factors. Activists locate or
mediatize their campaigns against firms in countries that are extreme in
terms of institutional quality, as well as socioeconomic performance. Either
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they target firms incorporated in healthy and wealthy economies where an
environmental consciousness is already highly advanced (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Matten & Moon, 2008), or they select companies that operate in
unstable and poorer economies with less developed ecological sensitivity
(Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003). In this latter case, NGOs/
media might specifically target firms operating in such countries to exert
pressure on the firms taking on (more) social/environmental responsibility.
Overall, these results seem to suggest that activists pursue a twofold
targeting strategy: selecting firms incorporated in high welfare-states where
the audience is likely to be supportive, while at the same time also providing
some monitoring of firms from countries with weaker economic contexts
and less institutional stability. So, regarding their welfare impact, should we
expect activists to provide the monitoring and whistle-blowing function that is
necessary for private regulation to emerge? Overall, not entirely. Activists,
even when they engage in criticism, are already working on the manufacturing
of anticorporate campaigns and are therefore going to strategically select
the countries, the industries and the firms they go after. So, should we be
pessimistic about the role that activism can play in achieving sustainable
development? Probably not either. Activists do play their role of agents of
change in countries and industries for which, in line with the Environmental
Kuznets Curve approach, there will be a favorable audience for their
activities. As other countries continue to develop, the role that activists can
play in sustainable development should expand as well.
Limitations
Despite the interesting and new findings presented and discussed above,
this study is certainly subject to limitations. First, regarding the connection
between our conceptual framework and our data, we did not test the
sequential dimension of our campaign production chain. In particular, we
did not study empirically the ordering going from the selection of countries,
industries and firms to criticize and then ultimately leading to full-fledged
campaigns. Even if it seems unlikely, it might be that campaigns come first
and criticism heat up after that. Anecdotal evidence seems to speak against
this (Wapner, 2009). However, this is something that should certainly be
studied empirically as it would reinforce our understanding of the manufac-
turing of campaigns and its implication on firms. In the same way, it would
be interesting to study why some criticism lead to full-fledged campaigns
while others do not (Wright & Boudet, 2012).
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Second, there are limitations to the data used here. By focusing on firms
present in the Fortune survey, we chose to explore Internet/media criticism for
very large companies that are likely to be primary targets for activists and
providing country/institutional variations. It would be interesting to replicate
the analysis for a broader sample of firms. That being said, it is unclear
whether including smaller firms would dramatically change our results.
Considering only large firms reduces the variation in the sample and should
make it more difficult to obtain results regarding firm-specific dimensions.
Similarly, regarding institutional effects, we focused on institutional
dimensions for firms’ home countries. It would be, however, interesting
to also explore what drives Internet/media criticism in host countries. If
activists play a monitoring role and become substitutes for deficient
governance in certain countries as well as counter-balance the influence of
multinationals (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), then this role should be observed
empirically in the foreign countries where these multinationals operate.
This certainly should be explored in future research.
We also do not know if the higher scrutiny and severity of criticism in
some countries is related to the fact that activists or NGOs “play tougher”
or whether there are just more activists in these countries, and therefore
more criticism. In that sense, future studies should explore how country-
specific factors and institutional conditions affect the supply of activism
and how this supply of activism determine the number of criticism and of
full campaigns that take place.
There are also potential endogeneity issues with some of our measures.
For instance, our measure of environmental awareness might in fact be
driven by previous activism. A larger dataset including many more years of
observations should allow to address this type of concern in the future.
Fourth, one of the limitations of the data conducted here is that this
data did not allow for a clear identification of who the criticizers were.
Most of the criticism clearly comes from activists acting through the media
and the Internet, but it is often very difficult to pinpoint where the criticism
started and who started it. To better understand the drivers of private politics,
this origin of criticism is something that needs to be studied in more details.
It is also difficult to differentiate Internet versus media criticism.
Publications such as The Economist, for instance, could be on paper or
online. It would be interesting, however, to see whereas Internet criticism,
as they can go viral, tend to become activists’ preferred option and if they
have a stronger impact on firms than traditional media.
Last, it would be interesting to study firm responses to the criticism they
are confronted with (Lenox & Eesley, 2009). As suggested earlier, one
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difference between criticism and full campaigns is that criticism does not
necessarily call for a direct response. However, it does not mean that firms
should not take actions. Should firms provide a public response, for
instance through the media? In which circumstances would such a public
response to criticism be the most appropriate? Conversely, should firms
engage in self-regulation  for instance through CSR investment  once
they have been criticized in order to prevent the occurrence of a full
campaign? This is in fact what the theoretical literature would suggest.
More theoretical and empirical work is warranted to provide answers to
these questions.
To conclude, this study provides a first exploration of how activists select
the firms they criticize and how this criticism potentially differs but also
interacts with broader campaigns as studied in previous literature. Many
questions, however, remain to be answered regarding the role that activists
play in monitoring firms and the environmental or social issues these firms
create, as well as, more generally, regarding the role that these activists can
play in creating self-regulating and sustainable economic systems.
NOTES
1. Naturally, a private politics chain leading to a full campaign against one firm
might also lead subsequently to another private politics chain targeting another
firm, as suggested by the idea of sequential targeting (Baron & Diermeier, 2007).
2. Criticism regarding companies comes from various sources (i.e., media,
Internet postings, news agencies, NGO reports, etc.) reporting in English, Spanish,
German, French, Italian, Portuguese, Mandarin, Korean, and Russian.
3. http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/best-global-brands-2008/
best-global-brands-2010.aspx
4. http://www.sustainability-index.com/07_htmle/data/djsiworld.html
5. https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Results/Pages/reports.aspx
6. http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/build/
7. http://epi.yale.edu/Countries
8. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
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